By  Kalana Senaratne   Sunday, 22 June 2014 00:00

The Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and its many monks take their ‘professional’ duty – the promotion of Sinhala Buddhism – quite seriously. And recently, they decided to spread their Sinhala Buddhism in Southern Sri Lanka, especially in Aluthgama. Gnanasara Thera called his audience to finish the Muslims if a single Sinhalese is touched; a singer invoked the lines of Tibet S. Mahinda (“es gedi walata hena gahalada sihalunne”). The mobs carried out the task it was supposed to carry out. Around four people (Muslims) were killed, over 80 were injured, many houses and shops were torched, terror was driven into the hearts and minds of the Muslim people; with violent and forceful retaliation and defence coming from the Muslim people as well. The President and the Defence-Secretary were away, overseas.

What ‘Aluthgama’ represented has sought to be analyzed in many ways, and if you place inordinate attention on the single speech made by Gnanasara Thera before violence was unleashed, it would be difficult to forgive him/her for imagining that this is largely about the BBS attempting to threaten the state, to capture the state. That, I believe, is a simple assessment of a very complex phenomenon; it is also not innocent, for in attempting to portray the BBS as a threat to the state, one not only misunderstands the nature of the state but also helps (and I think quite deliberately so) the political leadership to evade responsibility.

But the BBS is the underside of Sinhala-Buddhism, and the natural culmination of this project was going to be violence. And while ‘Aluthgama’ is a political moment which reveals many things, it raises a serious and fundamental question.

The principal question we are made to ask is: is the BBS a threat to the state?

I think the answer is ‘no’ and is also the wrong question, for a number of reasons.

For firstly, the BBS is very much part of the state for its ideology is largely the dominant ideology of the state. It is a Sinhala-Buddhist outfit promoting the project of Sinhala-Buddhism.

Secondly, a group such as the BBS cannot exist or sustain its campaign without the support of the powerful elements of the regime. And importantly, it cannot do so without the support of the people. It has to have a sympathetic populace, and it has. One is struck by the level of support and sympathy that the BBS and its broader political project have attracted, especially after the incidents in Aluthgama. From the legal and business professionals, right down to the students at local (especially Southern) universities, the level of sympathy that the BBS-project has attracted is quite staggering. This element needs to be vitally understood and remembered before anyone attempts to critique the BBS as being a threat to the state.

Thirdly, I do not think I heard anything new or strange or surprising from the BBS (especially Gnanasara Thera) in Aluthgama. At best, what I heard was simply the express articulation of what one thought the BBS really stood for. And that’s the only difference. And that rhetoric very clearly showed how well the formation of the current state – especially the army and the police – conforms to the wishes of the BBS. When Gnanasara Thera screams approvingly that there is still a Sinhala Army (Sinhala hamudaawak) and a Sinhala Police force (Sinhala policiyak), he is giving expression to the idea that this is what it is, this is how it ought to be.

Fourthly, as for Gnanasara Thera’s critique of the President in particular, a keen observer would have detected the subtle changes in tone and expression. In other words, Gnanasara’s critique of, say, Minister Rauf Hakeem, is far different from his critique of President Rajapaksa. And the claim that the Sinhalese have no leader is the standard Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist argument. More importantly, it is important to realize here that the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist camp has made the argument that they are not entirely happy with the post-war developments and policies of President Rajapaksa. For example, Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekera’s very interesting ‘Amathaka Wu Urumaya: Kawandayata Hisak’ (2011) is a book which is inspired by the understanding that the Sinhala-Buddhist project is not being realized in post-war Sri Lanka. This does not mean that they support Gotabaya Rajapaksa; Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is neither that simplistic to jump from one Rajapaksa to another, nor politically dumb to openly challenge President Rajapaksa and the state. And what we get in Gnanasara Thera’s critique of the regime is not really a challenge to the state, but rather another one of those ‘course-correction’ messages that you get from the likes of Ministers Wimal Weerawansa and Champika Ranawaka.

Fifthly, it is necessary not to underestimate the power of the state. It is a state that has tremendous military might. And it is one which is so powerful that it can effectively suppress any movement if it really wants to, and has every power to do so; legally, constitutionally, militarily, judicially or in any other imaginable way. The fact that it’s not happening with regard to the BBS tells us precisely what the BBS is all about.

If then what is the fundamental question that ‘Aluthgama’ makes us ask?

That fundamental, preliminary, question is nothing but the following: is the BBS a threat to the Sinhala-Buddhist project? That is the question we should ask, the question that should concern us, before we proceed to inquire whether the BBS threatens the state. And this is where one confronts the major challenge.

For firstly, every shred of evidence tells us that the BBS is not a serious threat to the Sinhala-Buddhist project. Where and how is it a threat when the people are silent? Where and how is it a threat when the politicians are unwilling to critique the BBS openly? Where and how is it a threat when the likes of Ven. Sobitha are silent? And as I mentioned before, the level of support that the BBS garners can be surprisingly high.

Secondly, it is challenging because this question can be answered mainly by the Sinhala-Buddhist community given that it is the overwhelming majority. And as long as the majority community is unwilling to ask that question and answer it, their inability to do so will only go to prove the obvious.

In conclusion, it is difficult to read the BBS as a threat to the state. It is equally difficult to read it as a threat to Sinhala-Buddhism. And if the BBS is not a threat, what it means to the Muslim people or any other community is terribly damaging. If I am wrong and if the BBS is indeed a threat to Sinhala-Buddhism, then can any Sinhala-Buddhist kindly tell me how it is so?